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Abstract
We analyze an agency model of political competition to examine
whether con￿ ict encourages hawkish behavior, and if such behavior
can itself aggravate con￿ ict. We consider situations of con￿ ict between
a state and an insurgent group, such as con￿ ict over a piece of land.
Negotiations are carried out on behalf of the state by a democratically
elected leader whose ability and ideology are imperfectly observed by
the electorate. A more capable leader can take a hardline position in
the negotiations (i.e. cede less land to the insurgents) at a lower ex-
pected cost (modeled as the cost of continued insurgency) than a less
capable one. Similarly, an ideologically hawkish leader enjoys greater
intrinsic utility from retaining land than a less hawkish leader. Two
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1main results that emerge are: certain types of politicians may be ex-
cessively hawkish as compared to their ￿rst best policy choices, which
itself increases the probability of con￿ ict; and for any credible vot-
ing strategy, the re-election probability of a hawk is greater than that
of a dove. Finally, we show that the voting equilibrium of this game
does not always achieve a constrained Pareto optimum suggesting that
third party mediation may improve welfare.
JEL classi￿cation: C72, D82, P16
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1 Introduction
In this paper we attempt to understand the dynamics of con￿ ict negotiation
between a polity and an insurgent group when the negotiator for the polity
is elected via the political process. Speci￿cally, we address the following
questions: When democratically elected leaders negotiate a settlement on
behalf of the citizens, does it lead to excessively extremist (or hawkish, in a
sense to be made more precise) policies? Do more hawkish politicians face an
inherent advantage when con￿ ict becomes a salient issue? Does the political
process achieve a ￿ constrained Pareto￿(or second best) outcome with regards
to con￿ ict negotiation?
There is at least casual evidence that during times of con￿ ict hawks and
hawkish policies carry the day. A look at the upper hand that hawks had
in determining Iraq policy as well as the electoral success that more hawk-
ish leaders seem to have enjoyed in Israel leads one to believe that hawks
and hawkish policies dominate in times of con￿ ict. For example, in analyz-
ing war Baliga, Lucca and Sj￿str￿m (2009) say that "in a fully democratic
country, a dovish bias is replaced by a hawkish bias when the environment
becomes more hostile." Kahneman and Renshon (2007) accept this point in
a well cited article and provide an explanation in terms of inherent human
bias. They say that "In terms of potential con￿ ict the same optimistic bias
makes generals and politicians receptive to advisers who o⁄er highly favor-
able estimates of the outcome of war." While accepting these explanations
we want to examine whether hawkishness can arise even in the absence of any
optimistic bias (as in Kahneman and Renshon) or any coordination failure
(as in Baliga, Lucca and Sj￿str￿m)1. More importantly, could it arise from
1In the concluding section we discuss the implications of our explanation compared
2the incentives of the political process itself? If the political process itself
is a cause of greater hawkishness, then one may perhaps see why the then
Lieutenant-General Moshe Yaalon, the Israeli army￿ s chief of sta⁄ (and no
policy dove) infuriated Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Defence Minister
Shaul Mofaz in 2003 by publicly questioning Israel￿ s tough policies in the
West Bank and Gaza (see New York Times June 2, 2005). Moreover, he
criticized the then Prime Minister Olmert￿ s ground invasion of Lebanon as
"It had no substantive security-political goal, only a spin goal." 2 The case
becomes even more interesting when we see how the same Olmert adopted
a dovish stance after losing the elections (and e⁄ectively ending any elec-
toral incentives he had) by saying "We have to reach an agreement with the
Palestinians, the meaning of which is that in practice we will withdraw from
almost all the territories, if not all the territories."3 Indeed, perhaps the most
important recent example of hawkishness came when US President Barack
Obama facing a lowered level of support among his electorate gave a hawk-
ish speech (ironically when accepting the Nobel peace prize) signalling his
intention to be tough in ￿ghting con￿ ict.4
Our model provides conditions under which electoral concerns will lead
to policies that are more hawkish than those of the median voter. Morevoer,
the same set of conditions also increase the chances of electoral success for
politicians who are more hawkish than the median voter. We hypothesize
that the voters hold imperfect information about their prospective leader￿ s
type, i.e. quality and ideology. Quality is modeled as a leader￿ s ability to
minimize the adverse impact of insurgent activities (such as terrorist attacks),
with some others in the literature.
2See ￿ Pressure mounts on Olmert to quit￿ , Rory Mccarthy, The Guardian 15 September,
2006, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/sep/15/syria.israelandthepalestinians1
for the article).
3(see Olmert: Israel must hand back land for peace with Palestinians
and Syria, Rory Mc Carthy, Guardian, Monday 29 September 2008, see
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/29/israelandthepalestinians.syria).
4See for example Kate Southwood￿ s article ￿ Obama, Nobel, and Realpolitik￿in The
Hu¢ ngton Post, December 14, 2009 where she notes precisely this electoral concern:
"President Obama￿ s depiction of just wars is not, fundamentally, contradictory to Pres-
ident Carter￿ s acknowledgment of war as an occasional necessity, but one wonders how
much less hawkish it might have been had he not been on the defensive. And how dif-
ferent would President Obama￿ s Nobel speech have been if, like President Carter, he had
been free of the pressures of realpolitik,..."
3while ideology is modeled as the willingness to bear the costs of insurgency
emanating from failure of a peace deal. Imperfect information by voters
regarding leader quality creates a ￿ natural bias￿in favour of more hawkish
positions, since a leader of high quality has an incentive to signal his ability
by choosing more hawkish policies. Moreover, since the leaders who are
inherently more hawkish have a lower cost of using hawkishness as a signal,
there is a favourable bias in terms of get re-elected. Further there is a political
failure in the sense that the political system ends up selecting policies that
are more extreme than the median which in turn escalates the probability of
the con￿ ict continuing next period.
In order to formalize these ideas, we embed a model of con￿ ict (similar to
Grossman, 1994) in a principal-agent model of political competition in which
the voters (the principals) use re-election as an incentive to induce the leader
(the agent) to manage the con￿ ict in an optimal way. The con￿ ict is modeled
as dividing a piece of land between two groups, one of which holds initial
control over the land. That group with the initial control has a politician
who makes a settlement (division of land) for them. There is asymmetric
information about politician type (quality and ideology). Voters have to
set optimal replacement (i.e. whether to re-elect or not) rules conditioning
the decision on the settlement reached, taking into account the mixed signal
about quality and ideology that comes from observing a particular settlement.
Let us make clear what we mean by this extremism or hawkishness: a hawk is
a person who has a higher utility from retaining more land, while a hawkish
policy from a particular leader is a policy more extreme than the one he
would ideally like to choose. We analyze if a hawkish policy emerges under
the optimal voting rule as well as discuss the electoral success of politicians
of di⁄erent ideologies under the optimal voting rule.
The main insight is that the electoral process leads to two kinds of hawk-
ishness ￿one, where politicians act in a more extreme fashion (give less land)
than they would ideally like to; and two, politicians who intrinsically favour
more extreme policies are more likely to get elected. The intuition behind our
result is the following. More capable candidates can sustain more hawkish
positions at a lower cost. As a result, they are able to signal their type by
choosing su¢ ciently extreme policies. Further, intrinsically hawkish politi-
cians have a lower cost of signaling hawkishness than the more dovish ones.
Hence, both high quality and intrinsic hawkishness leads to tough policies.
Voters cannot distinguish between intrinsic hawks and high quality leaders.
Hence, leaders have an incentive to behave hawkishly to signal their quality
4and inherent hawks have an intrinsic advantage in doing that. Thus, the
equilibrium voting strategies turn out to be such that doves are replaced at a
faster rate than hawks. A further question of interest is whether the voting
equilibrium of this model achieves constrained Pareto optimality. We show
that in general it does not. Indeed we show that if voters could bind them-
selves to re-electing every politician regardless of their quality ex ante voter
welfare may be higher. This implies that ￿ tying the hands￿of the politician
by making him agree to settlements proposed by a neutral third party can
be welfare improving. Thus, there is a role for bodies like the UN to achieve
Pareto improving settlements even in a situation of con￿ ict.
Our work is related to principal agent models (starting from Spence, 1973)
as well as models of incomplete contracting. (see Hart, 1995 and Tirole, 1999
for surveys of the incomplete contracts literature). More speci￿cally our pa-
per has modeling similarities with the so called incumbent-challenger models
which are essentially agency models of political competition. There is a wide
variety of incumbent challenger models in the literature5, with the simplest
involving pure selection strategies to weed out bad politicians. Some of the
more well known of such models with electoral accountability when politicians
make unobservable choices are presented in Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986),
Rogo⁄ and Sibert (1988), Rogo⁄ (1990) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(1997). Rogo⁄ and Sibert and Rogo⁄ use this framework to study political
budget cycles, while the other papers look at pure moral hazard problems.
Banks and Sundaram (1993) have elements of both moral hazard and adverse
selection, their politicians di⁄er in both quality (leading to adverse selection)
as well as some kind of unobservability of action (leading to moral hazard).
Coate and Morris (1995) consider the issue of the form of transfers to special
interest groups in an incumbent challenger framework. They address a pure
e¢ ciency question: namely, given that politicians may owe allegiance to spe-
cial interest groups what is the most e¢ cient way to make transfers to such
groups and is this e¢ cient form of transfer employed? In their framework
politicians do not essentially di⁄er in ability but in their preference over the
transfers they would like to make to special interest groups, in principle both
politicians could have chosen the best outcome. These models of electoral ac-
countability have a fair amount of empirical support as well (see for example
Besley and Case, 1995).
Several recent papers have used the political agancy model to shed light
5See Besley (2006) for a good discussion of the literature.
5on di⁄erent forms of political failures arising from electoral concerns and
asymmetric information. Majumdar and Mukand (2004) consider a model
of political agency where leader￿ s quality is modeled as his ability to pick
a socially desirable policy reform. The leader gets an interim signal as to
whether or not his reform is likely to succeed. While it is socially desirable
that a failing reform be scrapped, such an action will lead the voters to re-
alize that the politician took a wrong decision and therefore to lower their
estimate of his quality. Under certain conditions, this leads to the politician
resorting to a gamble by sticking to a failing policy. Aidt and Dutta (2007)
examines political failure arising out of the interaction between observation
lags, economic growth and a binding revenue constraint. The political failure
in their paper does not arise from asymmetric information about politician
quality (their politicians are homogenous) and their aim is to look at the mix
of short term vs. long term public good that is provided because of these in-
teractions. Unlike in our model, their policy myopia is constrained optimum.
In our analysis of second best we ￿nd a result similar to that of Haan Los
and Onderstal (2008) that randomization over which politician to re-elect
gives higher voter welfare than trying to separate types (and randomization
always dominates welfare under a pooling equilibrium).
Our work is also related to papers which provide rational choice explana-
tions of terrorism and the high cycle of violence e.g. Pape (2003) and Berman
(2003) which discuss the issue of strategic terrorism. Leadership in con￿ ict
is analyzed in a complete information framework by Hess and Orphanides
(1995)6 and Gupta (2008). Gupta (2009) looks at whether multilateralism
can provide an ￿ e¢ cient￿level of security. Schultz (2003) analyses the behav-
ior of hawks and doves over the period that the US-USSR con￿ ict continued
using a di⁄erent de￿nition of hawks and doves ￿he assumes that doves are
people who inherently have optimistic priors over the opponent￿ s motives
and the opposite for hawks. Some of the empirical evidence on the policy
positions of hawks and doves in that period is interesting and worth analyz-
ing to see how well it ￿ts the predictions of our model. Broadly, from our
model, we expect to see hawks continue to support hawkish positions while
doves will ￿ uctuate depending on their quality. This seems consistent with
the data presented in Schultz. None of these papers are however concerned
with the political failure arising out of asymmetric information.
There is a well established literature on con￿ ict and the distribution of
6See section 6 for a discussion of their paper.
6resources across groups (see for example Grossman, 1994, Conley and Temi-
nini, 2001 and Hirshleifer, 1995, Gar￿nkel and Skaperdas, 2007 and Jackson
and Morelli, 2009 for a review of the research on con￿ ict and Sanchez-Pages,
2009 for analyzing con￿ ict as part of the bargaining process). We contribute
to the literature by analyzing what kind of outcomes arise when con￿ ict
resolution occurs via the political process.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model,
characterizes the ￿rst best and compares it with the equilibrium under asym-
metric information. Section 3 analyzes the second best and compares it with
the voting equilibrium in section 2. In section 4 the model is extended for
a continuum of types. Section 5 analyzes the model when there are two
parameters-ideology and e¢ ciency, while section 6 concludes.
2 The model with homogenous ideology
This is a two period model. There is one policy parameter y 2 [0;1] to
be interpreted as the dimension of con￿ ict between two groups citizens (or
the landed class) denoted by C and protestors (or peasants) denoted by P 7.
The basic formulation is much like that of Grossman (1994) where there is
a division of land between two groups. For simplicity, we assume that the
initial control over the land is with group C8. Group C￿ s preferences over the
policy are represented by a utility function u : [0;1] ! R;u0 > 0;u00 < 0: We
denote the division by y, which means that y is the fraction of land retained
by the group C: A representative of group C proposes a settlement (i.e. a
y). Each settlement y leads to an expected cost of insurgency or terrorism
violence that members of P impose on members of C: This cost c is increasing
in y i.e. the more land the citizens retain for themselves, the higher is the
expected cost of terrorism. This can be thought of as a supply function of
terrorism which is increasing in y: In particular, we assume that protestors
in￿ ict c = p(y)V on the members of group C through their violent acts where
p is the probability of con￿ ict next period, following an o⁄er y and V is the
disutility to members of C from violence. Hence, given the policy y; the
utility of a member of the group C is u(y) ￿ p(y)V , thus p(y)V denotes the
7These are merely labels without any normative implications. Thus, citizens may well
be occupiers and protestors freedom ￿ghters.
8Nothing changes if we assume that initially the landed class has a fraction x and the
peasants have the remaining 1 ￿ x.
7expected harm caused by terrorism to a representative citizen i.e. a member
of group C in the event of the con￿ ict continuing. We assume that c is convex
in y: Note of course that the harm need not be actual personal harm to any
particular citizen, it could even be just the disutility caused by existence of
terrorism against the State. The assumption of the probability of the con￿ ict
continuing in the next period being an increasing function of land retained is
quite intuitive. The higher the land retained by group C, the less the number
of people in group P who accept the settlement. Thus, the higher will be
the probability of the settlement breaking down i.e. the con￿ ict continuing
the next period.9 For now we will assume that all members in group C are
identical in terms of both their utility from a policy as well as in facing the
same costs from terrorism.
We introduce heterogeneity among the citizen group in terms of the politi-
cian negotiating on their behalf in the following way. Assume that the prob-
ability of this con￿ ict continuing next period depends upon y but but the
cost of managing the con￿ ict depends on the quality (￿) of the politician
in group C in o¢ ce the next period. The politician￿ s type is unknown to
the voters. The politician knows his own quality and chooses y. Depending
upon his type, the society faces a probability of con￿ ict p(y) which will be
realized next period. We further assume that the payo⁄ in the event of a
con￿ ict continuing is also dependent on the type that is in o¢ ce at that time
so the payo⁄ in the event of a con￿ ict is V (￿
0) where ￿
0 is the quality of the
politician in o¢ ce the next period. We assume V is decreasing in ￿: The par-
ticular assumption is quite intuitive and can be rationalized in the following
way: ￿ acts as a sort of a summary measure of the politician￿ s credibility
with group P, his ability to convince the international community about the
reasons for choosing the settlement at that particular level and perhaps most
importantly his ability to control the dissident terrorists or manage the econ-
omy while the con￿ ict goes on. In nations where con￿ ict has been ongoing,
we may consider military experience as a proxy for quality. A higher ability
politician may perhaps be one who has better military experience and thus
can handle insurgency better than one with less experience. We implicitly
9One way to explain this is as follows: Each member l of group P must choose action
￿l 2 f0;1g where 0 means accepting the settlement and 1 means becoming a terrorist.
The payo⁄ to member l from becoming a terrorist is given by tl: Hence, a member of P
will become a terrorist if tl > u(1 ￿ y): Let F(y) denote the number of people who will
become terrorists if the settlement (or policy implemented) is y: The probability of con￿ ict
p is increasing in F(y):
8assume that the environment is such that con￿ ict is a salient issue and the
high prevalence of con￿ ict makes the ability to mimimize the cost of con-
￿ ict a key concern for voters. Footnote 12 gives a su¢ cient condition for
our analysis to go through even when there are quality di⁄erences between
politicians in handling the environment when there is no con￿ ict.
We use this model to study whether a politician has an incentive to be
hawkish (i.e. choose a high y) or whether he has an incentive to be dovish,
and the optimal voting strategy for a voter who can only observe y. The
incentive to be hawkish works in the following way: since a high quality
politician imposes low cost from terror, he can a⁄ord to be ￿ tough￿ . However,
a low quality politician may try to mimic him by acting tough as well. We
study what kind of equilibrium emerges in this scenario.
Sequence of actions
The game played is as follows
￿ t = T ￿ 1 : Voters set a performance standard10
￿ t = T : There is a politician of type ￿ in o¢ ce. The politician chooses
policy y 2 [0;1] which results in a probability of con￿ ict next period
p(y), which is not observable that period. We denote by V (￿) the cost
to the citizens if a politician of type ￿ is in o¢ ce conditional on con￿ ict
in period T + 1 and by E(V (￿)) the cost if the politician is replaced.
We assume that the expected quality of the replacement politician is
drawn from a known distribution.
Citizens observe y and vote on whether or not to keep the politician
in o¢ ce depending on whether the performance standard has been ful-
￿lled. If they decide to keep the politician in o¢ ce, he gets an ego rent
a > 0. If the politician is voted out, he is replaced by another politician
drawn from distribution D(￿).
￿ t = T + 1 : Payo⁄s are realized. The payo⁄ to a voter is given by11
u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿)
10It is of course possible to model this as a signaling game as well, where politicians
signal their type through a choice of y: This leads to multiple equilibria. The equilibrium
of the game where voters are moving ￿rst as in this model gives us an outcome which is
the best equilibrium of the signaling game from the voter￿ s point of view.
11We do not use time subscripts as there is no discounting. Total payo⁄s are simply a
sum of both periods payo⁄s.
9if the same politician is elected and is
u(y) ￿ p(y)E(V (￿))
if a new politician is elected. The payo⁄to a re-elected politician di⁄ers
from the voter simply by a. As p denotes the probability of a con￿ ict,
p(y)V (￿) is the expected cost if type ￿ is in o¢ ce and p(y)E(V (￿)) the
expected cost if the politician is replaced and an unknown type is in
o¢ ce.
2.1 The ￿rst best
Suppose that a politician of type ￿ is in o¢ ce and his type is known. Now,
if the same type is in o¢ ce next period he will just choose y that maximizes
the expected utility to him (and therefore to C members). In particular he
will solve
Maxy u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿)
First order condition gives us
u
0(y) = pyV (￿)
Thus, without elections we get a policy y￿(￿); i.e. the optimal policy as a
function of the politician￿ s type
However, this is clearly not the best from the voters point of view if they
had perfect information. Given that V (￿) is decreasing in ￿ a voters utility is
maximized when they replace a politician whose V (￿) is lower than expected
V: Thus, the optimal rule is to retain a politician if V (￿) ￿ E (V (￿)): Given
this rule, a politician solves the following
Maxy u(y) ￿ p(y)maxfV (￿);E(V (￿))g
which yields ￿rst order conditions
u
0(y) = py maxfV (￿);E(V (￿))g
which again gives us an optimal policy given the re-election rule: For example,
in the next section where we have two quality types, we have y￿
H as the
optimal y for a politician of type H conditional on her being re-elected, y￿
L as
the optimal rule for the politician of type L conditional on her being elected
10and y￿
A as the optimal y for any type conditional on her being replaced (by
someone with an expected type given by E (￿)):
We now show that under standard assumptions on the utility function,
the policy y chosen by a leader is increasing in ￿:
Lemma 1 Assume that uy > 0;uyy < 0;py > 0;pyy > 0; and V￿ < 0. Then
y￿(￿) is continuous and increasing in ￿. Moreover, the utility of any citizen
increases in ￿.
Proof. We have to di⁄erentiate this piecewise. For ￿ < E(￿); the ex-
pression is Maxy u(y) ￿ p(y)E(V (￿)) and for ￿ ￿ E(￿); the expression is
Maxy u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿): Total di⁄erentiation (of the ￿rst order condition)
for ￿ < E(￿) yields
pyy(y






uyy ￿ pyyE(V (￿))





uyy ￿ pyyV (￿)
Given our assumptions the terms in the numerator and the denominator
are both negative. Hence, the conclusion that y￿(￿) is an increasing function.
It is obvious that citizen welfare must be higher with a higher ￿:12
12As mentioned, we have implicitly assumed that in the event that there is no con￿ ict
there is no quality di⁄erence across politicians. More generally, if the utility to citizens
when thee is no con￿ ict were to also be dependent on the type in o¢ ce, the problem could
be re-written as maxy u(y)￿p(y)V (￿)+(1￿p(y))S(￿); where S(￿) is the value of peace
which depends on type.
u0(y) = py [V (￿) + S(￿)]
pyy(y￿)dy [V (￿) + S(￿)] + pyE(V￿(￿) + S￿(￿))d￿ = uyydy
112.2 Equilibrium under asymmetric information
We now characterize the equilibrium of the asymmetric information game
outlined earlier. Note that since we are solving for the Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the game, we need to specify both strategies and beliefs for
each type of agent. Thus, the equilibrium will involve voters setting perfor-
mance standards, the politician deciding whether to ful￿ll those standards
which determines whether the voters retain or replace the politician.
We formally de￿ne these as follows:
De￿nition 1 A performance standard y is a monotonic voting strategy by a
voter, i.e. if y ￿ y, voters re-elect a politician, and for all y < y, the voter
does not re-elect him
De￿nition 2 A performance standard is sequentially rational if for any choice
of y by a politician it is in a voters￿interest to implement the performance
standard.
For simplicity, in this section we characterize equilibria where there are
only two types of politicians, those with high ability (￿H)and those with low
ability (￿L)13 and let the probability of the politician being a high type be
sH. In this case it is easy to see that voters will either set a performance
standard that both types can ful￿ll (so we will have pooling) or they will set
performance standards so that only the type ￿H will be able to ful￿ll it. We
already assume that we are in the parameter range (i.e. the rents a are large
enough) where truth telling is not an equilibrium, so performance standards
















uyy ￿ pyy [V (￿) + S(￿)]
so as S￿(￿) > 0 and V￿(￿) < 0; numerator is indeterminate so V￿(￿) + S￿(￿) < 0 for y to
be increasing in ￿:
Given that our analysis is of situations where con￿ ict is salient (and consequently p is
high), it seems likely that the above condition is satis￿ed. In any case, the above condition
gives a su¢ cient condition for a hawkish drift.
13We extend the analysis to a continuum of types in the next section.
12The above condition says that the payo⁄ from a low type playing the
high type￿ s ￿rst best strategy and getting re-elected (and hence getting the
rents from o¢ ce a) is greater than playing the ￿rst best strategy (given that
in expectation an average type will take over) and not getting re-elected and
hence not getting the rents from o¢ ce.
Given that condition 1 is satis￿ed, for the performance standard to be
credible ex post, in either case the performance standard must be such that
it lies at or to the right of the ￿rst best policy which would be chosen by
the type ￿H: This is easy to understand: suppose the standard y was such
that it was to the left of y￿
H where y￿
H denotes the ￿rst best policy of the
politician of type ￿H; a politician of type ￿H would always play y￿
H. In that
case, (if the equilibrium is to be a pooling one), type ￿L must also play y￿
H.
In other words, the performance standard y would not be credible, as voters
would not be able to distinguish between ￿L and ￿H if ￿H actually played y￿
H
and ￿L played y. The argument is even more evident when the performance
standard involves separation. The following proposition summarizes this.
Proposition 1 Assume condition 1 holds. In equilibrium, either both types
choose y￿
H, or ￿L will play y￿
A and ￿H will play y i.e. he will just meet the
performance standard.
Proof. Suppose y < y￿
H; in that case ￿H will play y￿
H and hence reveal his
type, thus if ￿L plays y it is no longer optimal for voters to re-elect ￿L: The
second part of the equilibrium is essentially a characterization. Suppose the
equilibrium involves separation, it must be that the low type prefers not to





A)E(V (￿)) ￿ u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿L) + a





H)E(V (￿)) ￿ u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿H) + a
Clearly, voter welfare is maximized when the performance standard is such
that the low type is indi⁄erent between meeting the standard and not meeting
the standard14 as that will involve the least distortion for the high type.
14We assume here that the low type plays his ￿rst best when indi⁄erent to playing that
and meeting the standard. Further, the voter believes that all politicians who choose
y ￿ y are high types with probability 1 and those who choose y < y are low types with
probability 1.
13Now suppose the performance standard is such that both types meet it. In
that case, we only need look at the low type￿ s incentive constraint since if
that is satis￿ed, so will the high type￿ s incentive constraint. The low type￿ s





A)E(V (￿)) ￿ u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿L) + a
The least distortion (in this case this leads to only the low type being hawk-
ish) involves the performance standard being set equal to y￿
H as it is the
minimum required for no one to be able to credibly deviate, hence voters will
choose that to maximize their utility.
We now look at when the optimal standard involves pooling and when it
involves separation. Clearly, as the rents from o¢ ce increase, the low type is
willing to act more and more hawkish to stay in o¢ ce. Hence, beyond a point
separation may become too costly. Essentially the performance standard will
compare the payo⁄s of the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the best separating
equilibrium of the game where the politician chooses a policy and the voter
decides a re-election strategy to the best pooling equilibrium and choose the
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A)E(V (￿)) = u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿L) + a (1)
the performance standard involves pooling, otherwise it involves separation of
the two types.
Proof. The inequality on the left is the welfare to the citizens if both types
just meet the (optimally chosen) performance standard while the right hand






A)E(V (￿)) = u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿L) + a
which equates the low type￿ s gains from meeting the standard to that from
playing his true type. Clearly, voters choose the one which maximizes their
utility.
Remark 1 In both types of equilibria policy for one type is hawkish, in sep-
aration ￿H chooses y > y￿
H while in a pooling equilibrium, ￿L chooses y > y￿
L:
143 Comparison with the second best
We now turn to the other question we posed. Does the voting equilibrium we
analyzed implement the second best. Recall the second best is the highest
welfare that can be achieved by the voters given that they do not know the
type of the politician. The reason this may di⁄er from the voting equilibrium
we analyzed is because the additional restriction of sequential rationality we
imposed earlier does not have to be satis￿ed. For example the voters could
commit to re-electing all politicians and if the low type choose y￿
L as a policy
it would be optimal for voters to replace the politician which in turn would
mean that the politician would not choose y￿
L: When analyzing the second
best we do not require this kind of sequential rationality. So, if re-electing
all politicians maximize ex ante welfare then that gives us the second best.
We now illustrate when the second best di⁄ers from sequentially rational
voting equilibria. We ￿rst consider what happens when we are in a pooling
equilibria.
Proposition 3 If the voting equilibrium is a pooling one, it does not achieve
second best
Proof. In a pooling equilibrium both types chose y￿
H and voters re-elect both
types. We show that there exists a set of policy choices and voting decisions
that give a higher level of expected welfare. Suppose, instead voters decided
to re-elect all politicians then the policies chosen by each type would have
been y￿
L and y￿
H i.e. the ￿rst best for each type. Clearly this achieves higher





























L is the ￿rst best policy for ￿L:
This however does not tell us what the second best is when the voting
equilibrium is a pooling one. However, clearly it must either involve re-
electing all politicians or replacing all politicians. To see what is better we
simply compare payo⁄s from these two strategies. Thus, we get the following
result
15Proposition 4 If the voting equilibrium is a pooling one, the second best















re-electing all politicians achieves second best, with the reverse inequality re-
placing all politicians is better.
Proof. The right hand side is the payo⁄ when all politicians are replaced
in which case it is a optimal strategy for them to play y￿
A leading to a voter
welfare given by the right hand side, otherwise re-electing all politicians is
better. Except in the case where the two sides are equal a mixed strategy
clearly does worse. as this induces politicians to play an inoptimal strategy.
Clearly for any mixture, the low type will play a policy between yL and yA
and a policy between yA and yH will be chosen the high type. This is clearly
inoptimal.
What happens though when the performance standard is a separating
equilibrium? In this case there is a tension between selecting the ￿ right￿
type vs. the increased distortion of selection15. In general the performance
standard is increasing in the rents from o¢ ce so the distortion in policy
from the high type increases. Thus, in general on expects a cuto⁄ value
where re-electing (or replacing) all politicians may lead to a higher welfare.
Thus, we need to compare the utility under a separating equilibrium to that
from re-electing all leaders. Denote the utility from a separating equilibrium
by US = sH
￿
u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿H)
￿
+ (1 ￿ sH)fu(y￿
A) ￿ p(y￿
A)E(V (￿))gThus,















A)E(V (￿))g ￿ US (3)
then a strategy which induces separation achieves the second best.
Proof. The right hand side is the voter welfare under a separating equilib-
rium. If a policy of re-electing or replacing (the LHS) gives a lower welfare
then indeed we achieve second best by separation . As we have noted earlier
all randomized outcomes are worse.
15For a paper which illustrates this clearly in a dynamic framework, see Snyder and
Ting (2008).
16Summary 1 The second best outcome has to be one of the three types: 1.
Separate the types 2. Always re-elect and 3. Never re-elect. Any decision
other than this is dominated.
4 The model with a continuum of types
We now analyze the model when the politician￿ s type is drawn from a con-




where ￿ > 0;￿ < 1 drawn from
a commonly known cdf D(￿). The realized value of ￿ is not known to the
public. We now de￿ne the equilibrium of this game.
De￿nition 3 A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is (1) A sequen-




p(y)V (￿)d￿ (2) A choice of y, given the announcement y,i.e. a mapping




! [0;1];such that it maximizes total payo⁄s for the politi-
cian, given the re-election rule and (3) a set of beliefs b : [0;1] ! B(￿) i.e. a
mapping from the y chosen into a probability distribution over types denoted
by B(￿) that are given by Bayes rule.
We now characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium described exists if for y <




such that u(y)￿p(y)V (e ￿)+a = u(y￿)￿p(y￿)E(V (￿))




with b ￿ > e ￿ such that u(y￿) ￿ p(y￿)V (b ￿) + a = u(y) ￿
p(y)V (b ￿)+a. Given these conditions, the equilibrium has the following char-
acterization (1) For all ￿ ￿ ￿ < e ￿, the politician chooses a strategy y￿
where y￿ is given by the solution to u0(y) = py maxfV (￿);E(V (￿))g; for
e ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b ￿; each politician chooses y, for all ￿ > b ￿; a politician chooses
y > y, where y is given by u0(y) = py maxfV (￿);E(V (￿))g(2) Beliefs of
the voters that if y < y, the politician￿ s quality range is given by the solu-




￿D(￿)d￿ and if y ￿ y, the politician￿ s quality is given by u0(y) =
17py maxfV (￿);E(V (￿))g(3) Politician￿ s beliefs are that for a choice of y < y,
he will not be re-elected and for a choice of y ￿ y, he will be re-elected
Proof. The following incentive compatible constraints need to hold. Given
that the politician of type e ￿ is indi⁄erent to meeting the performance stan-
dard and playing the strategy optimal for his type, we must have that for
all ￿ < e ￿; u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿) + a < u(y￿) ￿ p(y￿)E(V (￿)); where y￿ solves
u0(y) = py maxfV (￿);E(V (￿))g
At e ￿;u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿) + a = u(y￿) ￿ p(y￿)E(V (￿)):
For e ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b ￿; u(y) ￿ p(y)V (￿) + a > u(y￿) ￿ p(y￿)E(V (￿)):
Beyondb ￿; the politician ￿nds it optimal to play y corresponding to u0(y) =
py maxfV (￿);E(V (￿))g; as u(y)￿p(y)V (￿)+a > u(y)￿p(y)V (￿)+a; where
y > y
We now show that there exist e ￿ and b ￿ such that this is optimal for the
voter as well. Note that if voters see y < y they correctly infer that the type
of politician is given by the solution to u0(y) = py(y;￿)maxfV (￿);E(V (￿))g:
For it to be incentive compatible, it must be that for all ￿ < e ￿ the voter is bet-
ter o⁄ replacing, i.e. V (￿) < E(V (￿)): Further, at the range e ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b ￿; the
average quality at this range should be such that the voter is at least indi⁄er-
ent to replacing and reelecting the politician. Now average quality is given by
b ￿ Z
e ￿
￿D(￿)d￿, which we denote by E1(V (￿)) so E1(V (￿)) ￿ E(V (￿)): Finally, if
￿ > b ￿;V (￿) > E(V (￿)) and voters again correctly hold beliefs in that range
that ￿ is given by the solution to u0(y) = py(y)maxfV (￿);E(V (￿))g:
Note for ￿ > b ￿ politicians play a ￿rst best policy which exceeds the
minimum standard. Thus, the distortion is in the ￿ middle range￿of quality
i.e. when e ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b ￿. Both in the low range of quality as well as in a high
range, politicians play their ￿rst best strategy.
It is worth noting that there are no credible deviations that any type of
politician can make. In other words, there does not exist any deviation by a
politician of any type such that voters would be able to determine the type
of the politician from that type. Thus, the equilibrium described is intuitive
in the sense of Cho Kreps (1987) and survives the criteria of equilibrium
domination (see for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1992) for details) as
well.
18Remark 2 The equilibrium satis￿es the intuitive criterion
To understand this, note, that at any ￿ ￿ ￿ < e ￿ a politician would not
meet the standard even if voters believed it were of a higher type and re-
elected the politician, hence they will never deviate, at e ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b ￿ suppose
a politician were to play y > y, voters would still continue to re-elect him,
hence the politician would not ￿nd it optimal to deviate. The same hold for
the type range ￿ > b ￿: The key here is that there is no continuous reward
variable which would a⁄ect the politicians payo⁄, he either gets re-elected or
he does not.
A comparison with Spence￿ s model is inevitable at this point. The most
noteworthy di⁄erences are as follows: unlike education in Spence￿ s model,
more hawkish policies a⁄ect the payo⁄ of the principal (i.e. the electorate).
Moreover, the voters have access only to discrete contracts- viz. re-elect or
replace, while the ￿rm in the Spence￿ s model could pay any wage. Hence, this
accounts for the di⁄erences in the equilibrium characterization. Of course,
the two dimensional model we introduce below is a further important di⁄er-
ence.
5 The model with heterogeneous ideology
In this section we analyze both the policy adopted and the probability with
which politicians of di⁄erent ideologies are replaced. We consider the situ-
ation where both the ideology and quality of the leader are unknown and
hence di⁄erent performance standards cannot be set for di⁄erent politicians.
5.1 The model with both ideology and quality unknown
We now look at what happens when ideology of politicians vary16 i.e. politi-
cians are intrinsically more hawkish or dovish and ideology is unknown.17
There are now two parameters characterizing the politician, his ability and his
ideology. We assume that ability and ideology are independently distributed.
We denote the utility function of a politician of type ￿ and quality ￿ from
16Of course, ideologies of citizens also vary, we shall however look at whether politicians
are more or less hawkish with respect to the median citizen￿ s ideal point.
17We brie￿ y discuss the implications for the model in the concluding section when
politicians are heterogenous and ideology is known.
19policy y as ￿u(y;￿)￿p(y)V (￿)+a if re-elected and ￿u(y;￿)￿p(y)E(V (￿)) if
replaced; where ￿ > 1 denotes a hawkish politician, ￿ = 1 denotes a median
politician and ￿ < 1 denotes a dovish politician with ￿ is drawn from a con-
tinuous distribution with cdf G(￿), ￿ > 0 and E(￿) = 1. As in the earlier




with cdf D(￿): Voters know neither
the quality nor the ideology of the politician though the expected value is
commonly known.18
We will now show that the optimal replacement rule will be such that
a hawk will be re-elected with a higher probability than a median (ideol-
ogy) politician who in turn will be re-elected more frequently than a dovish
politician. In other words, any optimal voting standard will be such that
the (cuto⁄) quality at which a hawk gets re-elected will be lower than the
quality for which a median will get re-elected, which in turn will be lower
than the quality at which a dove gets re-elected. For this, we ￿rst note that
for any given quality of the politician, the cuto⁄ at which he is indi⁄erent
to meeting that standard and playing his ￿rst best policy is increasing in ￿:
The following lemma proves this
Lemma 2 Let y￿ denote the ideal policy of a politician of type ￿, for any
given ￿: Further, let the performance standard y> y￿ satisfy ￿u(y)￿p(y)V (￿)+
a = ￿u(y￿) ￿ p(y￿)E (V (￿)): Then for all ￿;
dy
d￿ > 0:
Proof. Total di⁄erentiation of the above expression yields
￿u






￿u0(y) ￿ py(y)V (￿)
Now, from the ￿rst order condition, we know that if ￿ > E(￿);￿u0(y￿) ￿
py(y￿)V (￿) = 0; so for y = y > y￿; ￿u0(y) ￿ py(y)V (￿) < 0: Again, if
￿ < E(￿); ￿u0(y￿) ￿ py(y￿)E (V (￿)) = 0; so for y = y > y￿ ￿u0(y) ￿
py(y)E(V (￿)) < 0: Given that V is decreasing in ￿ (so E(V (￿)) < V (￿)) this
18Most politicians promise to be much more centrist than they are before elections. For
example, the former US President George W Bush came to power on a platform of being a
￿ compassionate conservative￿but turned out to be quite hawkish in his positions. Hence,
gauging the ideology of a leader from election promises is di¢ cult and voters often can
make imprecise estimates about ideology until a politician actually assumes o¢ ce.
20means that ￿u0(y)￿py(y)V (￿) < 0: Further, by de￿nition u is monotonic in




Given that the performance standard which makes a politician indi⁄erent
to ful￿lling it and not ful￿lling it is increasing in the degree of hawkishness of
the politician, it is easy to show that any incentive compatible performance
standard must re-elect a more hawkish politician at a lower threshold of
quality. The following proposition formalizes it.
Proposition 7 For any sequentially rational performance standard y; if ￿￿
(respectively ￿￿0 ) denotes the quality level at which a politician of ideology ￿
(respectively ￿0) is indi⁄erent to ful￿lling and not ful￿lling the performance
standard, then ￿￿ Q ￿￿0 according to whether ￿ R ￿0:
Proof. For any given y let ￿￿ be the quality level for a politician of ideology ￿
who is indi⁄erent to ful￿lling or not ful￿lling the performance standard. Now,
if ￿ > ￿0; it must be that ￿￿0 strictly prefers not ful￿lling the performance
standard. From Lemma 2 we know that the performance standard at which a
politician is indi⁄erent to ful￿lling or not ful￿lling a standard is increasing in
￿: Hence, it follows that the quality cuto⁄ for a given performance standard
is higher the less hawkish a politician.
Thus, we see that asymmetric information about quality and ideology
leads to an endogenous bias in the electoral process. It essentially arises
because both quality and hawkishness leads to a higher y; voters are unable
to distinguish the two and hence the optimal standard favours ideologically
hawkish politicians.
6 Empirical implications, Extensions and Con-
jectures
We have analyzed how the political process leads to an escalation of con￿ ict.
The need for voters to screen politicians leads them to set standards which are
more extreme than they would ideally like. Such extreme standards however
itself increase the probability of con￿ ict, thus con￿ ict leads to hawkishness
as a result of optimal screening by voters, but such hawkishness itself exacer-
bates con￿ ict by increasing its probability next period. As high quality and
ideological hawks both choose high levels of y, there is an endogenous bias
21in the electoral process which favors hawks. Further, we provide a rationale
for how an international body like the UN can play a fruitful role in con￿ ict
resolution by making people commit to treaties.
Our model provides some clear empirical implications. It suggests that
when the probability of con￿ ict is very high, we see politicians get more ag-
gressive and natural hawks get re-elected more easily. In countries like Israel
which have continuing con￿ ict, we would thus expect to see a preponderance
of leaders with military experience as seems to be the case. Indeed, one can
look at whether when militarized disputes are high right wing leaders get
elected more often. Such data is available from Correlates of War (Jones,
Bremer and Singer, 1996) and ideology of parties for Western democracies
is available from the Manifesto Project (Budge at. al, 2001). Further, in
our model, the hawkish behavior of politicians should be independent of the
state of the economy at that time which will distinguish it from alternate
explanations that we discuss.
A related explanation which looks at electoral concerns is by Hess and
Orphanides (1995) where a politician of unknown type goes to war when
facing a sagging economy to see if he can prove to be a better war leader.
In that case if he tackles war well, that becomes the salient issue and he is
re-elected while if he is not, there is nothing to lose as he would not have
been re-elected anyway. One would expect in that case that con￿ icts are
endogenously created and vary with the business cycle. In our model no such
correlation would be seen which gives rise to a testable hypothesis. Further,
when leaders themselves do not know their type as in Hess and Orphanides
we would not see leaders who get re-elected turn out to be hawks with a
higher probability.
Clearly, there are several alternate reasons why one can see policy ex-
tremism. Glazer, Gradstein and Konrad (1998) show that if policy reversal
is costly, politicians may choose policies more extreme than the median voter
in order for rational voters to re-elect them as a costly policy reversal will
take place if the opposition comes to power. We would expect to see policy
extremism in either direction while in our model the extremism is always in
one direction. Again, there would be no endogenous bias in favor of hawks
getting re-elected in Glazer, Gradstein and Konrad. Neither is this electoral
bias in favor of hawks implied by Kahneman and Renshon (2007) or Baliga,
Lucca and Sjostrom (2009) though both predict that in times of con￿ ict a
democracy may behave particularly agressively.
Of course another simple explanation of hawkishness is that con￿ ict causes
22a preference shift in the electorate so the median voter becomes more hawk-
ish leading to hawkish policies being implemented. However, assuming a
proportionate shift, all types become more hawkish than before; it will not
be the case that intrinsic hawks get re elected with a higher probability as
their distance from the median voter will not have changed.
We would want to extend this paper in two directions. The ￿rst is to
endogenize the candidate entry process using a citizen candidate model. We
want to see if the extremism in the political process can get mitigated by a
larger number of moderate people standing for election. We conjecture that
the answer is no. This is because more moderate people are likely to be
weeded out at a faster rate than more extreme people because of the bias in
the re-election process which reduces their incentive to stand as candidates.
Another line of work is to look at a potentially in￿nite horizon model-as the
low quality politicians get weeded out (for a given ideology) at a higher rate
than high quality ones, the distribution of quality over time gets shifted to-
wards a higher mean quality. However, this will not lead to only the high
quality people remaining in the long run. The reason is that all types of
politicians face a probability of death every period, hence there will be a lim-
iting distribution, it seems the policy will still be hawkish under this limiting
distribution (and the optimal standards set under this limiting distribution
will still favour hawks). A further interesting issue arises when politicians
have a commonly known ideology and voters can set di⁄erent performance
standards for di⁄erent groups of politicians. In that case, if separation is de-
sired, hawkish politicians would be subject to a higher standard than dovish
ones as a hawk ￿nds it easier to implement a given standard, for the same
quality level. This would lead to escalated con￿ ict with hawks as compared
to doves, and initial conditions (i.e. who is in o¢ ce) would determine the
course of a con￿ ict. Of course, if extremely hawkish people are in o¢ ce se-
lection may not be desirable as the costs are too high so pooling may occur.
These issues, along with a more rigorous examination of empirical evidence
is left for future research.
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